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I. Introduction
In 1993 Mancur Olson wrote: "While there have been lots of writings 
about the desirability of "social contracts" to obtain the benefits of law 
and order, no one has ever found a large society that obtained a peace-
ful order or other public goods through an agreement among the indi-
viduals in the society.”1 The preceding assertion is as accurate today as 
it was when put forth by Olson.
The first part of this paper reasons that pre-colonial Somali soci-
ety constitutes an example of a large society where social order was 
garnered, and where public goods, (i.e., law and order, security, and 
protection of property rights) were provided by voluntary agreement 
among individuals in society. That is, in the absence of formal author-
ity, coercion, hierarchy, or utilization of selective incentives. In arguing 
that social order was obtained, and public goods provided by volun-
tary agreement among individuals, much focus is put on the comple-
mentary relationship between the Somali genealogical structure and 
the xeer system. The former being the principal form of social orga-
nization with the latter adding governance to it. Through a discus-
sion on the complementary relationship between the two systems, it 
is shown that collective action was feasible both within and between 
communities, making pre-colonial Somali society the sole known large 
society characterized by feasibility of collective action in the absence 
of coercion, hierarchy, utilization of selective incentives, and authority. 
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While Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau disagree on the nature of man in 
the state of nature, the common denominator of their theories is that 
authority, capable of exercising coercive power, is necessary for the 
establishment of a civil society.2 Locke, for instance, wrote that “the 
great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property; to which in the state of nature there are many things want-
ing.”3 Put in other words, the state is considered the safeguard of 
man's life, liberty, and estate.
For this reason, the state is considered irreversible in the modern 
world, as Buzan put it, "there is no real option of going back."4 Even if 
we accept that man, in the state of nature, was rather reasonable and 
rational would his reason and rationality not become an implacable 
enemy of collective action? Against this backdrop, it is quite remark-
able that men, free and equal amongst one another, produced a peace-
ful social order in pre-colonial Somali society by voluntary agreement, 
i.e., in the absence of structured authority to decide disputes and pun-
ish offenders. What, then, explains the presence of a command-obedi-
ence relationship in the absence of central power or even hierarchy? 
Why did people consent to norms and obey the rules and laws? What 
constitutes the source of the moral authority that enabled the xeer sys-
tem to issue commands and demand obedience in the absence of coer-
cive power? 
The second part of this essay is more analytical and bears the bur-
den of answering these questions. A revised version of David Beeth-
am's (1991) theory on legitimacy is used to analyze the obtainment of 
social order in a context devoid of authority and hierarchy. The xeer 
system is considered a regime and it is theorized that social order may 
be obtained without formal authority if society is characterized by fea-
sibility of collective action and uniformity of shared beliefs. If a regime, 
understood in this context as a system of governance, conforms to the 
shared beliefs in society and the latter is typified by uniformity of shared 
beliefs, a likely result is that it becomes indistinguishable from them in 
terms of legitimacy. Consequently, the laws, rules, values, principles, 
and norms that constituted the xeer system were considered legitimate. 
Hence, the xeer system could issue commands and demand obedience. 
Bildhaan  Vol. 21
168
The xeer system was, in other words, a normative and moral author-
ity that could issue commands and demand obedience because it 
derived its greater legitimacy from society’s external and internal ulti-
mate source of authority, i.e., Islam and Somali culture. By providing 
an account of why the xeer system worked, i.e., what enabled it to issue 
commands and demand obedience in the absence of authority capa-
ble of exercising coercive power, this paper is an effort to deepen our 
understanding of governance in pre-colonial Somali society. Since the 
main contention put forth is that the pre-colonial Somali people con-
stituted an example of a large society where social order was obtained 
by voluntary agreement, a working definition of a “large society” is 
needed before we proceed. The definition offered here focuses not on 
quantification of population size. Suggesting a fixed number, say e.g., 
a million-plus people, is evidently arbitrary in nature. A “large society” 
is understood in this essay as a human community where knowledge 
of commonality between its members is not acquired through face-
to-face relationships as is characteristic of ‘primary groups,”5 but a 
human association in which commonality between members is imag-
ined6 and where members are dispersed across an extensive territory, 
rendering tight intimacy with most other members improbable. The 
Somali people inhabit a large territory on the Horn of Africa of about 
643.7376 square kilometers.7 Even if one assumes that the genealogical 
and xeer system were confined to the pastoralists, which there is hardly 
any evidence to suggest, who mainly inhabit the area currently known 
as Somaliland and as British Somaliland Protectorate during colonial 
era, one is referring to an area of about 137.6000 square kilometers or 
about the size of England and Wales put together.8
II. Collective Action
Collective action theory was first formulated by Mancur Olson in his 
now seminal book, The Logic of Collective Action. The fundamental 
assumption that constitutes the point of departure of collective action 
theory is one based upon the conflict between individual rationality 
and collective rationality.9 That is, rational individuals do not volun-
tarily pursue action with the aim of achieving the collective interest of 
their respective groups. In a nutshell, what is rational on an individual 
level is not rational on a collective level, rendering voluntary coopera-
tion in large groups, in the absence of coercion or outside inducements, 
virtually impossible.10 As Olson puts it:
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In a large group in which no single individual's contribution makes 
a perceptible difference to the group as a whole or the burden or bene-
fit of any single member of the group, it is certain that a collective good 
will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside induce-
ments that will lead the members of the large group to act in their 
common interest.11
The literature on collective action is now vast, rich and far more com-
plex than the brief introduction provided here.12 However, it remains 
the case that no one has hitherto been able to identify a large society 
where collective action was feasible, allowing for obtainment of social 
order by voluntary agreement among individuals in society. The fol-
lowing sections bear the burden of showing that collective action was 
feasible, both within and between communities, in pre-colonial Somali 
society, rendering obtainment of social order by voluntary agreement 
possible.
III. The Genealogical System
The Somali genealogical13 structure,14 a very complex and sophisticated 
system of social organization and social identity formation, constitutes 
the main source of division within an otherwise largely homogenous 
nation.15 The genealogical structure consists of five main genealogi-
cally related communities: the Dir, Issaq, Darood, Hawiye, and Rah-
anweyn. Each of these can be further divided into major sub-groups, 
primary lineage groups and mug-paying groups.16 In other words, each 
major group and sub-groups are further divided into various smaller 
groups based on common descent all the way down to the smallest col-
lective entity possible. Thus, an individual, in Somali society, embodies 
different kinship-based social identifications, any one of which will 
become salient depending on the context. Moral proximity and gene-
alogical proximity are closely intertwined within this structure. All 
the agnatic groups between the major groups and the nuclear family 
are essentially in-groups, characterized by a strong sense of fellow 
feeling. The closer the genealogical ties are between individuals and/
or sub-groups, the stronger is the sense of fellow feeling between them. 
Conversely, moral proximity fades and peters out as the genealogical 
distance grows, stressing the centrality of genealogy within the Somali 
genealogical structure. The Somali word for genealogy is “Abtirsiinyo” 
and means a recitation of agnation. Somalis bear their father's first 
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name as their own surname, enabling them to trace their ancestors 
patrilineally in the male line. As Lewis observes:
It is a matter of family pride to teach children their father's gene-
alogy. This duty usually bestows mainly on the mother and the ease 
with which small children of eight or nine years can recite their gene-
alogies up to their clan-family ancestor is astonishing, especially since 
the genealogy may include well over twenty names, some of which 
are repetitive. Everyone knows his genealogy up to the eponym of his 
clan-family.17 
Thus, memorizing one's genealogy allows individuals to easily 
establish proximity in relation to others and determine the membership 
of kinship-based in-groups all the way to the main genealogical com-
munity.
IV.Governance (Xeer)and Conflict Resolution
Characteristic of the Somali genealogical-structure is the complete 
absence of hierarchy both within and between groups,18 setting it apart 
from other so-called traditional social organizations that are normally 
characterized by formal and stable hierarchy, e.g. chief structures and 
the like. In pre-colonial Somali society, no single individual had the 
authority to make unilateral decisions on behalf of a group or sanction 
unacceptable behavior. All important decisions were reached collec-
tively by agreement, made possible by a set of publicly negotiated 
and universally accepted laws, values, norms, principles, ideals, and 
codes of conduct that combined define the Xeer-system.19 In Somali, 
Xeer can mean, although related, different things depending upon the 
context within which the word is used. When translated to English, 
Xeer means custom or contract.20 Based on Somali cultural values, prin-
ciples, and elements of Islam,21 the Xeer system defined acceptable 
behavior, and thus regulated both intra- and inter-group relations in an 
otherwise non-hierarchical context.22
Three equally important and inextricably linked pillars constitute 
the fundamental building blocks of the Xeer system. First, the Xeer sys-
tem is, as mentioned above, based on a mixture of Somali values, laws, 
principles and elements of Islam.23 Through these laws, values and 
principles, normative questions such as what ought to be considered 
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“right” or “just” are answered, providing a publicly negotiated and 
universally accepted moral and normative framework for co-existence. 
Second, the Xeer system provides guidelines and procedures for deci-
sion-making and conflict resolution.24 Characteristic of these proce-
dures is that they are non- hierarchical and democratic; decisions are 
reached by voluntary agreement between disputant parties.25 Third, 
decisions reached are considered “legally” binding and are normally 
honored and upheld voluntarily by involved stakeholders,26 stressing 
the self-regulatory nature of the Xeer system. Historically, and to some 
extent presently, conflict resolution and reconciliation was sought for at 
ad hoc community meetings (Shiir in Somali) between disputant par-
ties on virtually all imaginable issues and topics,27 These community 
councils allowed for contesting parties to present their case in front of 
the wider community and collectively selected arbitrators. Steered by 
Somali cultural values, principles and Islam,28 the main goal of these 
ad hoc Shiir-councils was to seek justice (Xaqq in Somali) and reach 
a voluntary agreement between involved stakeholders by peaceful 
negotiations.29 Compromises reached were considered “legally bind-
ing” and the involved communities were responsible for ensuring that 
they were respected and upheld, not merely in the present but also 
in the future, creating a sort of “legal” precedence for future genera-
tions.30 Another significant feature of Shiir-councils is that they were 
somewhat democratic, allowing all adult men equal access and partic-
ipation irrespective of their social status31. Another component of the 
Xeer system in relation to conflict resolution and reconciliation was the 
“Guurti,” an informal ad hoc panel32 whose members were collectively 
selected, not because of their social background or because they held 
titles or could enforce decisions by coercive means, but mainly because 
they were experienced, wise, knowledgeable, and widely respected. It 
is important to stress that Guurti-members were essentially arbitrators 
and had no authority to either make or enforce any decisions. As Lewis 
notes, 
This informal court of arbitrators has no means of enforcing its find-
ings, in these circumstances, settlements thus ultimately depend upon 
the readiness of the disputants to make peace and to some degree on 
the skill of the arbitrators in obtaining an acceptable compromise.33
Distinguishing a Guurti council from ordinary Shiir councils is that 
the former would normally only be arranged in circumstances of seri-
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ous inter-group crisis.34 While both Shiir and Guurti councils were vital 
conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms and undeniably 
added significant structure and governance to the loose communi-
ty-based system, compromises were reached by voluntary agreement 
through peaceful negotiations. Collective action was, in other words, 
feasible both within and between communities. Even when an accept-
able compromise between disputant parties proved unobtainable, the 
violent conflicts that ensued would normally not exceed the frame of 
publicly negotiated and broadly accepted codes of conduct. In other 
words, virtually all aspects of both intra- and inter-group relations 
were managed and regulated within the realm of the collectively 
negotiated and broadly accepted normative and moral foundation of 
the Xeer system. Consequently, man's life, liberty, and estate35 were 
guaranteed in the absence of any type of over-arching authority capa-
ble of exercising coercive power. Hence, the contention that pre-colonial 
Somali society might be the sole known large society to obtain social 
order by voluntary agreement among individuals in society. What, 
then, explains the presence of a command-obedience relationship in 
the absence of authority or even hierarchy? What constitutes the source 
of the moral authority that made people obey the rules? Although 
formulated in the context of formal power (e.g., government), David 
Beetham's theory of legitimacy is useful in answering these questions.
V. Legitimacy 
Max Weber is broadly considered one of the founding fathers of twen-
tieth-century social science and has influenced numerous disciplines.36 
His definition of the state, for instance, as the "form of human commu-
nity that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate phys-
ical violence within a human community,"37 remains the most widely 
used definition of the state in the study of politics. Together with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Weber has profoundly influenced the study of legit-
imacy, where he is considered the locus classicus of the “belief theory on 
legitimacy.”38 The emphasis on “belief” in his approach to the study of 
legitimacy has influenced countless subsequent thinkers,39 while at the 
same time generating fierce critique from others.40 For instance, Carl J. 
Friedrich sees legitimacy as a question of "whether a given rulership 
is believed to be based on a good title by most men subject to it or 
not."41 Peter Stillman on the other hand, writes that "the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of a government is a matter not of popular opinion nor of 
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belief about the ‘appropriateness’ or ‘good title’ of the government"42 
and defines legitimacy as "the compatibility of the results of govern-
ment output with the value patterns of the relevant systems."43 In the 
Legitimation of Power (1991)44 David Beetham launches a fierce attack on 
Weber's conception of legitimacy by arguing that Weber reduces legiti-
macy to a single dimension, i.e. belief in legitimacy, thereby voiding the 
concept of objective and moral content. Moreover, Beetham contends 
that elements such as legality and consent are independent of beliefs.45 
In amending Weber's definition, Beetham asserts that "a given power 
relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, 
but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs."46 Beetham's 
own definition of legitimacy is based on three inextricably linked and, 
according to him, universal components: conformity to rules (legal 
validity), the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs, and legit-
imation through expressed consent.47 For Beetham, power can be 
considered legitimate when it conforms to these components. For the 
moment, however, attention should be drawn to the third dimension, 
which, as will be shown in what follows, is only applicable to govern-
ments and not regimes.
VI. Consent and Regimes
According to Beetham two conditions are necessary for action, at least 
in a western-liberal context, to be considered an expression of con-
sent. The first is the absence of coercion and the second is presence of 
choice between alternatives. As he writes: "it is making an agreement 
to subordination under conditions of choice between alternatives that 
confers legitimacy on the exercise of power, and a corresponding obli-
gation to obey."48 While he concedes that what counts as consent is 
culturally specific and is thus not absolutely definable, he maintains 
that "the convention within contemporary liberal democracies is that 
it is the act of taking part in elections that legitimates government and 
secures the obligation of citizens in principle to obey it."49  A regime 
can be understood "as the formal and informal organization of the cen-
ter of political power, of its relations with broader society. A regime 
determines who has access to political power and how those who are 
in power deal with those who are not."50 In addition, a regime tells us 
something about the type of political system in place, e.g. authoritar-
ianism, totalitarianism, and democracy.51 A regime is merely under-
stood as a system of governance in the present context. Government, 
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however, can be understood as "the actual exercise of political power 
within the framework of the regime and, more specifically, to those 
organizations and people charged with the duty of governing."52 
It is by now evident that Beetham does not distinguish between gov-
ernments and regimes in his discussion of consent. This has far more 
serious implications for the applicability of his theory of legitimacy 
to regimes than one might think at first glance. To say that citizens 
express consent and confer legitimacy on governments by actively and 
freely taking part in elections and thus choose between alternatives, 
e.g. political parties, is a line of reasoning that is hard to contest. The 
same line of reasoning is far less convincing when applied in the con-
text of regimes. If the choice between alternatives is a necessary con-
dition for expression of consent, then virtually no regime can claim 
to enjoy the consent of citizens. In which society do people choose 
a regime among alternatives and thus express their consent to that 
regime? Equally important is how efficiency, stability, and continuity 
can be ensured if a regime can be altered by a majority in society every 
four years or so? While presence of choice between alternatives may be 
significant in relation to legitimation of governments, it is clear that the 
same cannot be the case for regimes. An important distinction between 
a government and a regime is that the former is the latter's agent 
of action, which can exercise power. A regime cannot exercise coer-
cive power independent of a government. The relationship between a 
regime and citizens is therefore not one characterized by direct dom-
inance and subordination. Consequently, absence of organized pub-
lic protests against a regime can be considered expression of consent, 
especially when the regime conforms to society's normative order/
shared beliefs from whence it derives its legitimacy in the first place.
VII. Social Order without Authority
If a regime, understood in this context as a system of governance, 
largely conforms to the shared beliefs in society, a likely result is that it 
becomes indistinguishable from them in terms of legitimacy. Once this 
happens, there is no need for citizens to confer legitimacy to the regime 
through directly expressed consent. Acceptance of the shared beliefs in 
society automatically translates into legitimation of the regime when 
and if it conforms to the shared beliefs in society and the latter is 
characterized by uniformity of shared beliefs. Since a regime cannot 
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exercise power independent of a government, the absence of organized 
public protest against it ought to be considered expression of consent 
on the part of individuals in society. For Beetham, actions that publicly 
express consent are important "because they constitute public expres-
sions by the subordinate of their consent to the power relationship and 
their subordinate position within it; of their voluntary agreement to 
the limitation of their freedom by the requirements of a superior."53 In 
the absence of a government or another authority, capable of exercising 
coercive power, individuals' acceptance of their subordinate position 
appears superfluous. How then can social order be obtained and main-
tained in a society where there is no formal authority that can exer-
cise coercive power? Social order can be obtained, and public goods 
provided in the absence of authority (e.g. government) if two condi-
tions are met. Uniformity of shared beliefs, while important, is merely 
a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. An equally important 
condition is feasibility of collective action. In a society characterized 
by feasibility of collective action and presence of uniformity of shared 
beliefs, the normative order in society turns into a moral authority 
with the capacity to issue commands and demand obedience. People 
then obey rules and consent to norms because of subjective moral 
obligations to obey rather than due to fear of sanction. In other words, 
people obey rules because they can be justified in terms of their beliefs.
VIII. Heer and Social Order in Pre-Colonial Somali Society 
The critical and observant reader might at this point have noted that 
the preceding discussion on the obtainment of social order and pro-
vision of public goods in the absence of a formal government or any 
other type of authority is highly hypothetical. Evidently, collective 
action is normally not feasible in large groups in the absence of coer-
cion, hierarchy or utilization of selective incentives, let alone in large 
societies.54 While an established normative framework undeniably 
contributes to social cohesion, it is quite evident that the shared norms 
and values that underpin it do not simply obtain but must be con-
structed,55 and it is hard to imagine how that could be done in the 
absence of a state and government. It is nevertheless the case that col-
lective action, as discussed in previous sections of the present paper, 
was feasible both within and between communities in pre-colonial 
Somali society. Equally important for understanding the obtainment of 
social order and provision of public goods in pre-colonial Somali soci-
Bildhaan  Vol. 21
176
ety, by voluntary agreement and consent, is the uniformity of shared 
beliefs that characterized it. 
To understand how the Xeer system could issue commands and 
demand obedience in the absence of an authority that could enforce 
rules, laws, and decisions by coercive means, we must look at the 
ultimate source of legitimacy in pre-colonial Somali society. Beetham 
argues that to understand justifiability of rules one must identify the 
authoritative source from which they stem. As he writes, "it is the 
impressiveness of the source from which they derive as well as the 
moral persuasiveness of their content that gives social rules their justi-
fiability."56 A distinction can, according to Beetham, be drawn between 
external and internal sources of legitimacy of rules. Pre-colonial Somali 
society derived the legitimacy of its rules from Islam (external source) 
and from its own cultural legacy, i.e. tradition. All Somalis adhere to 
Sunni-Islam57 and are virtually culturally homogeneous,58 stressing 
the uniformity of shared beliefs in society. There was, due to high level 
of cultural homogeneity, limited need for negotiating which values 
and norms that ought to be considered universal. Likewise, complete 
religious homogeneity meant limited need for interpretation of divine 
will. In other words, the Xeer system, a regime without a government, 
could issue commands and demand obedience because it completely 
conformed to the shared beliefs in society. For this reason, the laws, 
rules, values, principles, and norms that constitute the Xeer system 
were considered legitimate.  Hence, uniformity of shared beliefs 
together with feasibility of collective action was sufficient for provision 
of public goods and obtainment of social order in a society character-
ized by the absence of formal authority and hierarchy.
IX. Conclusion
As has been shown in this essay, pre-colonial Somali society constituted 
a large society, where social order was obtained by voluntary agreement 
and consent among individuals, equal amongst one another. Man's life, 
liberty and estate was, in other words, guaranteed in the absence of hier-
archy and authority, capable of exercising coercive power. Uniformity of 
shared beliefs in society together with feasibility of collective action, both 
within and between communities, enabled the Xeer system, a regime 
without a government, to demand obedience or rather duty. As the Xeer 
system completely conformed to the shared beliefs in society, its content 
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was considered legitimate.  Consequently, might was turned into right 
and obedience into duty. As the present case suggests, it is possible to 
produce a civil society characterized by political liberty, where man is 
not subject to inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another 
man, in the absence of formal authority to settle disputes, punish offend-
ers and protect the wronged. 
Asserted earlier in the essay, the Somali people inhabit a huge area 
on the horn of Africa of about 643.7376 square kilometers,59 stretching 
from present day Djibouti in the north to present day northern Kenya in 
the south. There is consensus in the academic literature that the Somali 
nation has never been governed by a centralized authority prior to Euro-
pean colonization in the 19th century. It is therefore hard to explain 
how religious, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity was constructed in 
the first place. Even more difficult to comprehend is how uniformity 
of shared beliefs, stemming from cultural and religious homogeneity, 
was preserved in the absence of a central authority. It is likewise hard to 
explain why collective action was feasible. Evidently, collective action is 
not feasible in large groups in the absence of coercion, hierarchy or utili-
zation of selective incentives, let alone in large societies.60 While explain-
ing why collective action was feasible is beyond the scope of this essay, it 
has been proposed that it was so both within and between communities, 
making pre-colonial Somali society the sole known large society charac-
terized by feasibility of collective action. The intrinsic predicament of 
collective action is one revolving around a conflict between individual 
rationality and collective rationality. Put differently, what is rational on 
an individual level is not rational on the collective level, making col-
lective action in large groups, in the absence of coercion, hierarchy or 
utilization of selective incentives, virtually impossible.61 If we assume 
that people are very reasonable and rational as assumed in classical 
social contract theories,62 is it not sound to suggest that precisely their 
rationality and reason will become an implacable enemy of collective 
action? It appears that people in pre-colonial Somali society were not 
merely reasonable enough to comprehend and appreciate the utility of 
civil liberty, they were at the same time prudent and provident enough 
to suspend their individual rationality, rendering collective action fea-
sible.
Lastly, Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from 
Somalia in 1991 in the wake of the Somali civil-war and currently func-
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tions as a de-facto sovereign state, is often referred to as one of few 
successful peace/state-building cases in the post-Cold War era.63 By 
mixing Somali institutions of governance with constitutional democ-
racy and by institutionalizing the former (the Guurti), Somaliland has 
created an organic and legitimate hybrid state rooted in society. In 
doing so, Somaliland has transcended the (semi) Weberian OECD-
model of statehood64 and given birth to the hybrid turn in the liter-
ature on peace and state building. Unique to the Somaliland case is 
that successful peace/state-building was achieved in the absence of 
foreign intervention, mediation or any other form of foreign aid. In 
other words, the processes of peace and state building in Somaliland 
were internally led and characterized by local ownership. A substan-
tial body of scholarship brings attention to the instrumentalization 
of Somaliland's cultural-specific conflict resolution methods (e.g. 
Shiir and Guurti councils) in explaining successful peace and state 
building in Somaliland.65 The scholarship on Somaliland's peace and 
state-building achievements is, however, characterized by lack of focus 
on feasibility of collective action and uniformity of shared beliefs in 
society. It is highly doubtful that peace and state-building could have 
been achieved without foreign intervention if collective action was not 
feasible within and between the different communities in Somaliland. 
Research that brings feasibility of collective action and uniformity of 
shared beliefs into the center of analysis could deepen and enhance our 
understanding of the internally led peace/state building processes in 
Somaliland and ultimately answer the question as to why Somaliland 
remains the sole known example of successful post-civil-war peace/
state-building characterized by local ownership.66 Furthermore, does 
Somaliland not constitute an example of company of men, indepen-
dent and equal one amongst one another, that met together and set up 
a government and a state?67 
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present context. Their existence does not alter the fact that pre-colonial Somali 
society constitutes the sole known example of a large society where social 




62. See e.g. Rousseau, 1993; Locke, 1948.
63. Boege, et al., 2008.
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65. e.g. walls, 2009; Renders, 2012; Renders, Terlinden, 2010; Bradbury, Abokor 
& Yusuf, 2003; Boege, et al., 2008; Richards, 2014; Jhazbhay, 2003.
66. While the need for increased local agency and local ownership is dis-
cussed in critical scholarship on peace/state building (see e.g. Pugh, 2009; 
Richmond, 2009; Donais, 2009; Millar, 2014), it remains the case that nobody 
has yet explained how post-conflict societies can produce successful peace/
state-building without foreign intervention. It appears logical and reasonable 
to propose that collective action must be feasible both within and between 
different communities if sustainable peace/state building efforts are to emerge 
sustainable in post-conflict environments. 
67. In the Second Treatise of Government John Locke wrote “There are no 
instances to be found in story of a company of men, independent and equal 
amongst another, that met together and in this began and set up a govern-
ment” see. Locke, 1948, p, 50. 
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